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Research Article
According to the law of conservation of energy, the total 
amount of energy of an isolated system can never 
increase. In the domain of psychology, the idea that 
energy is a limited resource originated with Freud 
(1923/1961). Energy models have been little used in psy-
chology since Freud, though, with the rare exception 
of the ego-depletion model developed by Baumeister, 
Bratslavsky, Muraven, and Tice (1998). According to this 
research, “the self’s acts of volition draw on some limited 
resource, akin to strength or energy. . . , therefore, one act 
of volition will have a detrimental impact on subsequent 
volition” (Baumeister et al., 1998, p. 1252). Research on 
ego depletion has substantial implications. It has been 
claimed that reliably exerting self-control, either actively 
doing something “good” or avoiding the temptation to act 
on “bad” impulses, can greatly reduce many of the major 
ills that affect society and people’s personal lives, such as 
“crime, violence, unwanted pregnancy, drug addiction, 
venereal diseases, bankruptcy, and premature deaths” 
(Baumeister, Muraven, & Tice, 2000, p. 130). It is not sur-
prising that the work of Baumeister et al. (1998) has had 
an impact on a number of disciplines, including advertis-
ing, behavioral economics, business, consumerism, law, 
management, marketing, and medicine. In fact, it is fair to 
say that this seminal article by Baumeister et al. has 
become a classic: At the time of this writing, it has more 
than 1,250 citations in the Web of Science.
When ego depletion was first proposed, the idea of a 
limited resource was a convenient metaphor. Given how 
fundamental exerting self-control is thought to be, it is 
important to establish the energy source that is depleted 
and to provide a mechanism by which ego depletion 
occurs. The most popular explanation found in the litera-
ture involves glucose. Gailliot et al. (2007) presented 
nine studies supporting three main findings: (a) Blood 
glucose levels are reduced after performing a self-control 
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Abstract
The idea behind ego depletion is that willpower draws on a limited mental resource, so that engaging in an act of self-
control impairs self-control in subsequent tasks. To present ego depletion as more than a convenient metaphor, some 
researchers have proposed that glucose is the limited resource that becomes depleted with self-control. However, there 
have been theoretical challenges to the proposed glucose mechanism, and the experiments that have tested it have 
found mixed results. We used a new meta-analytic tool, p-curve analysis, to examine the reliability of the evidence 
from these experiments. We found that the effect sizes reported in this literature are possibly influenced by publication 
or reporting bias and that, even within studies yielding significant results, the evidential value of this research is weak. 
In light of these results, and pending further evidence, researchers and policymakers should refrain from drawing any 
conclusions about the role of glucose in self-control.
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task but not after performing a comparable cognitive task 
that does not require self-control; (b) low levels of blood 
glucose after a first self-control task predict behavioral 
deficits on a second self-control task; and (c) participants 
whose glucose levels are restored by ingesting a glucose 
drink after a self-control task perform better on a subse-
quent task than do participants who are given a diet 
drink between tasks. They concluded that self-control 
depletes blood glucose, which leads to decreased self-
control on subsequent tasks, and restoring glucose levels 
replenishes the ability to exert self-control.
Although the conclusions drawn by Gailliot et al. 
(2007) have been extraordinarily influential, their glucose 
hypothesis remains controversial. The mechanism they 
propose has been challenged, and the reliability of their 
results has been disputed. Kurzban (2010) argued that 
the glucose mechanism, as presented by Gailliot et al., is 
biologically implausible. The mechanism invokes the 
idea that self-control tasks deplete glucose because of 
energy consumption by the brain, but the supporting 
evidence shows changes only in blood glucose levels. 
Kurzban cited evidence that the sort of self-control tasks 
used in the literature have little effect on brain metabo-
lism and that changes in blood glucose are unlikely to 
reflect blood glucose uptake by the brain.
There are also concerns about the empirical evidence 
for the glucose mechanism. For instance, Schimmack 
(2012) showed that the number of significant results 
reported by Gailliot et al. (2007) is too large, given their 
average power. In other words, these results are likely to 
be influenced by publication bias or p-hacking (see 
Francis, 2012; Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011). 
Kurzban’s (2010) concerns were supported by a reanaly-
sis of the data from Gailliot et al., in which he found that 
self-control does not decrease blood glucose levels, and 
by recent failures to replicate the effect of glucose on 
self-control ( Job, Walton, Bernecker, & Dweck, 2013; 
Kelly, Sünram-Lea, & Crawford, 2015; Lange & Eggert, 
2014; Lange, Seer, Rapior, Rose, & Eggert, 2014).
The effect of glucose on self-control has been exam-
ined in three broad categories of studies:
•• Correlational studies measure effects on blood 
glucose levels before and after self-control is 
exerted (Dvorak & Simons, 2009; Gaillot, 2012; 
Gailliot et al., 2007; Molden et al., 2012).
•• Glucose-ingestion studies manipulate blood glu-
cose levels by leaving enough time between inges-
tion and a control task for glucose to be absorbed 
into the bloodstream (Birnie, Smallwood, Reay, & 
Riby, 2015; Denson, von Hippel, Kemp, & Teo, 
2010; DeWall, Baumeister, Gailliot, & Maner, 2008; 
Dickinson, McElroy, & Stroh, 2014; Gailliot et al., 
2007; Gailliot, Peruche, Plant, & Baumeister, 2009; 
Howard & Marczinski, 2010; Job et al., 2013; Kelly 
et al., 2015; Lange & Eggert, 2014; Lange et al., 
2014; Masicampo & Baumeister, 2008; Wang & 
Dvorak, 2010). Although the findings from these 
studies provide mixed support for the glucose 
hypothesis, the methods used imply a mechanism 
that is consistent with the proposals of Gailliot 
et al. (2007).
•• Glucose-rinsing studies examine the impact of sim-
ply rinsing one’s mouth with a glucose solution 
before exerting self-control (Hagger & Chatzisarantis, 
2013; Lange & Eggert, 2014; Molden et al., 2012; 
Sanders, Shirk, Burgin, & Martin, 2012). Results 
from these studies suggest that the signal of glu-
cose from the mouth to the brain is sufficient to 
neutralize the ego-depletion effect. This mecha-
nism is consistent with the results of the ingestion 
manipulations but suggests that the effect does not 
depend on a metabolic explanation.
To help settle the growing concerns in the academic 
community regarding the reliability of the glucose mecha-
nism, which in turn has implications for the ego-depletion 
hypothesis that it underpins, we sought to use a new 
meta-analytic tool, p-curve analysis, to investigate the pres-
ence of publication and reporting biases in this literature.
Method
Literature-search strategy
We looked for studies supporting the idea that sugar con-
sumption is related to ego depletion and self-regulation. 
Specifically, we considered any study exploring the 
hypothesis that glucose ingestion or rinsing improves 
performance (e.g., overcoming an impulse, inhibiting an 
aggressive reaction, or controlling a cognitive process) or 
ameliorates the effect of an ego-depleting experience in 
these laboratory self-regulation tasks. We also included 
studies testing whether performance in laboratory tasks 
(again, specifically those that explicitly require self- 
regulation) is correlated with pre- or posttesting sugar 
levels. Studies in which participants were not asked to 
drink a sugary beverage but simply to rinse their mouths 
with it were also included in the present analyses; this 
literature also supports the idea that sugar consumption 
improves self-regulation (even if it challenges the specific 
hypothesis that such improvement is achieved through 
metabolic processes).
Given these criteria, we excluded experiments show-
ing a relation between sugar consumption and cognitive 
processes (e.g., short-term memory or general cognition 
function) that prima facie do not seem to pose demands 
on self-regulation (e.g., Carter & McCullough, 2013; 
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Owen, Scholey, Finnegan, Hu, & Sünram-Lea, 2012). In 
addition, we also excluded studies that investigated the 
correlation between general glucose levels (or regular 
glucose ingestion) and self-regulated behavior in natural-
istic settings over many days. This included, for instance, 
studies on the relationships between glucose ingestion 
and smoking cessation and studies on the relationship 
between diabetes and various psychological processes 
(see Gailliot & Baumeister, 2007). These studies rely on 
measures that differ substantially from the dependent 
variables gathered in laboratory-based ego-depletion 
tasks, and the lack of experimental control makes the 
results amenable to alternative explanations that bear lit-
tle or no relation to ego depletion and self-regulation.
We began our search by inspecting a small set of stud-
ies that had included an exhaustive literature review. 
These included a meta-analysis by Hagger, Wood, Stiff, 
and Chatzisarantis (2010) on the general ego-depletion 
literature, a study by Job et al. (2013) exploring individ-
ual differences in the impact of glucose on self-control, 
and Lange and Eggert’s (2014) recent attempt to replicate 
the effect of sugar consumption or rinsing on ego deple-
tion. Then, to make sure that we included all relevant 
studies, we conducted a systematic search in Web of Sci-
ence and Google Scholar for the term “glucose” along 
with “ego depletion,” “self-control,” or “self-regulation.” 
This strategy allowed us to identify 18 articles with one 
or more eligible studies. All these studies are listed in 
Table 1 and are also marked with asterisks in the refer-
ence list. Furthermore, we found out that one of our 
selected studies (Masicampo & Baumeister, 2008) had 
been included in the famous project on the reproducibil-
ity of psychological science (Open Science Collabora-
tion, 2015). This replication was also included in our 
analyses, which resulted in a total of 19 articles.
p-curve analysis
To assess the reliability of this set of studies, we used 
p-curve analysis, a recently designed meta-analytic tool 
that allows for the exploration of various biases solely by 
examining the distribution of significant p values 
(Simonsohn, Nelson, & Simmons, 2014). Imagine a set of 
studies exploring an effect that does not exist. Occasion-
ally, these studies will yield a significant result (i.e., a 
p value lower than .05) just by chance. In this scenario, all 
p values will be equally likely: 5% of studies will have 
p values lower than .05, 4% of studies will have p values 
lower than .04, and so on. Consequently, the p values of 
a set of studies exploring a nonexistent effect should typi-
cally follow a flat distribution. Note that this is not the 
case if the studies are exploring a true effect: In that case, 
significant p values should follow a right-skewed distribu-
tion in which small p values (e.g., p < .01) are more 
prevalent than larger p values (e.g., p between .04 and 
.05). As explained by Simonsohn et al. (2014), this can be 
easily understood if one imagines an experimenter explor-
ing a very large effect with a large sample of participants. 
Most likely, the experimenter will observe a very low 
p value. Experiments with smaller effect sizes and smaller 
samples are simply less extreme versions of this ideal sce-
nario. Even for low-powered studies, the distribution of 
p values should be right skewed. This implies that, in 
principle, one can know whether a set of experiments is 
exploring true effects or null effects simply by checking 
whether their p values follow a right-skewed distribution 
or a rather flat distribution. An interesting feature of this 
approach is that it focuses exclusively on significant p values 
(i.e., studies for which p < .05); consequently, its results 
are unaffected by publication bias.
Simonsohn et al. (2014) designed an online appli-
cation (available at http://www.p-curve.com) that allows 
researchers to test whether an observed distribution of 
p values is significantly right skewed or suspiciously flat, 
which could suggest that the significant results are false 
positives. A simple way to test whether the distribution of 
p values is significantly right skewed is to compare the 
number of significant p values lower than .025 with the 
number of p values between .025 and .05 by using a bino-
mial test. A potential shortcoming of this approach is that 
this binomial test gives the same weight to exceptionally 
small p values (e.g., .00001) as to p values barely smaller 
than .025 (e.g., .024). To overcome this limitation, the lat-
est versions of the p-curve application conduct not only a 
binomial test but also an alternative analysis, known as a 
continuous test, that is sensitive to the exact p values.
If the distribution of p values is not significantly right 
skewed, this might mean that the studies lack any eviden-
tial value or, in other words, that the significant results 
could be false positives. However, failure to find a signifi-
cant right-skewed distribution might also be due to a lack 
of statistical power (e.g., if the analysis includes a very 
small number of studies). Simonsohn et al. (2014) sug-
gested that in order to determine whether the distribution 
of p values is too flat, one should test whether the p-curve 
is flatter than the theoretical distribution that one would 
observe in a set of studies with 33% statistical power. If 
the p-curve is significantly flatter than this very flat stan-
dard, a common conclusion is that the set of studies might 
lack evidential value and that they might be the product 
of publication bias, selective reporting, or p-hacking.
Selection of statistical contrasts
We selected the key statistical contrasts of each study 
following the guidelines offered by Simonsohn et al. 
(2014). In the case of correlational studies or experiments 
with just two groups, we registered the target correlation 
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coefficient, the statistic testing the regression slope, 
or the statistic testing the difference of means. In com-
plex factorial designs, if researchers expected the ego- 
depletion effect to disappear in a specific condition, then 
we registered the statistic testing the interaction. In con-
trast, if they expected to find a complete cross-over inter-
action, we registered the statistics for the two simple 
effects. A total of 38 statistical contrasts were included in 
the analyses. In accordance with the recommendations of 
Simonsohn et al. (2014), when two statistics were equally 
valid, we used one of them in the main analysis and the 
other one in a second analysis that we refer to as a 
robustness test. In most cases (four out of five), we 
adopted the general rule of selecting the first one to 
Table 1. Studies Included in the Analyses and Their Key Statistical Contrasts
Study Sugar rinsing? Key statistical contrast p
Birnie, Smallwood, Reay, and Riby (2015) No t(15) = 2.469a .02605
Denson, von Hippel, Kemp, and Teo (2010), Study 1 No t(67) = −2.19 .03201
Denson et al. (2010), Study 2 No t(151) = 2.24 .02655
DeWall, Baumeister, Gailliot, and Maner (2008), Study 2 No F(1, 55) = 6.64 .01268
Dickinson, McElroy, and Stroh (2014) No z = 1.88 .06011
Dvorak and Simons (2009) No F(1, 177) = 5.63 .01873
Gailliot (2012) No r(50) = –.30 .03071
Gailliot et al. (2007), Study 1 No F(1, 100) = 6.08 .01537
Gailliot et al. (2007), Study 2 No t(33) = 2.20 .03492
Gailliot et al. (2007), Study 3 No r(14) = –.62a .01041
Gailliot et al. (2007), Study 4 No r(10) = .56 .05828
Gailliot et al. (2007), Study 5 No r(21) = .45 .03120
Gailliot et al. (2007), Study 6 No r(15) = .43 .08493
Gailliot et al. (2007), Study 7 No F(1, 57) = 5.04 .02866
Gailliot et al. (2007), Study 8 No F(1, 69) = 5.45 .02249
Gailliot et al. (2007), Study 9 No t(16) = 3.13 .00646
Gailliot, Peruche, Plant, and Baumeister (2009) No t(47) = 2.21a .03201
Hagger and Chatzisarantis (2013), Study 1 Yes F(1, 24) = 8.42 .00783
Hagger and Chatzisarantis (2013), Study 2 Yes F(1, 30) = 6.12 .01925
Hagger and Chatzisarantis (2013), Study 3 Yes F(1, 32) = 4.06 .05238
Hagger and Chatzisarantis (2013), Study 4 Yes F(1, 40) = 10.32 .00260
Hagger and Chatzisarantis (2013), Study 5 Yes F(1, 36) = 7.28 .01055
Howard and Marczinski (2010) No F(4, 75) = 2.95 .02544
Job, Walton, Bernecker, and Dweck (2013), Study 1 No t(78) = 2.10 .03896
Job et al. (2013), Study 2 No F(1, 58) = 5.16 .02684
Job et al. (2013), Study 3 No F(1, 139) = 5.28 .02306
Kelly, Sünram-Lea, and Crawford (2015) No F(1, 67) = 0.80 .37430
Lange and Eggert (2014), Study 1 No F(1, 68) = 1.12 .29366
Lange and Eggert (2014), Study 2 No F(1, 110) = 0.01a .92053
Lange, Seer, Rapior, Rose, and Eggert (2014) No t(68) = 0.05a .96027
Masicampo and Baumeister (2008) No F(1, 111) = 5.311 .02305
Molden et al. (2012), Study 1 No F(1, 83) = 2.05 .15596
Molden et al. (2012), Study 2 Yes F(1, 39) = 4.54 .03947
Molden et al. (2012), Study 3 Yes F(1, 28) = 5.02 .03317
Open Science Collaboration (2015); replication of 
Masicampo and Baumeister (2008)
No F(1, 158) = 0.379 .53902
Sanders, Shirk, Burgin, and Martin (2012) Yes t(49) = −2.129 .03831
Wang and Dvorak (2010), Simple Effect 1 No t(31) = 2.55 .01593
Wang and Dvorak (2010), Simple Effect 2 No t(32) = 3.12 .00381
Note: The statistical contrasts were selected according to the guidelines of Simonsohn, Nelson, and Simmons (2014). A complete 
p-curve disclosure table justifying the selection of each statistical contrast is available at the Open Science Framework (https://osf 
.io/yf8p3/).
aThese statistical contrasts were replaced by alternative contrasts in the robustness test (for further details, see the p-curve 
disclosure table at the Open Science Framework).
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appear in the text for the main analysis and the second 
one to appear for the robustness test. However, on one 
occasion (Birnie et al., 2015), we broke this rule because 
the conclusions of the authors relied more heavily on 
one of the statistics than on the other. In this particular 
case, we selected the more appropriate statistic for the 
main analysis and the other one for the robustness test. 
We found no studies in which three or more statistics 
were equally valid for p-curve analysis. A p-curve disclo-
sure table with all the selected statistics and the justifica-
tion for our choices are available at Open Science 
Framework (https://osf.io/yf8p3/).
Results
The key statistical contrasts of the studies included in our 
analysis are shown in Table 1. Figure 1 plots the fre-
quency of each range of p values among these studies. As 
the figure shows, the main p-curve did not fit with the 
right-skewed distribution that one would expect if these 
studies were exploring a true effect. Although there were 
no significant results immediately below .05, p values in 
the interval between 0 and .04 show, if anything, a left-
skewed distribution. Not surprisingly, the statistical con-
trast testing the right skewness of the p-curve was 
nonsignificant (binomial test comparing the proportions 
of contrasts with p values < .025 and those with p values 
between .025 and .05: p = .575; continuous test: z = −0.83, 
p = .204). In other words, the distribution of p values was 
not significantly different from what would be expected 
if the null hypothesis (in this case, that the average effect 
size is zero) were true. Furthermore, the observed distri-
bution is flatter than would be expected if the studies 
were simply underpowered. Statistical analyses con-
firmed that the p-curve was significantly flatter than 
would be expected if there were an effect but the studies 
had only 33% power on average (binomial test: p = .019; 
continuous test: z = −2.08, p = .019). Thus, we can reject 
the hypothesis that although there was an effect, the 
studies had an average power of only 33% to detect it. 
The results were very similar for the robustness test, 
which also failed to find significant evidence of right 
skewness (binomial test: p = .500; continuous test: 
z = −0.88, p = .190) and, in fact, detected that the p-curve 
was significantly flatter than would be expected if there 
were an effect but the studies had only 33% power on 
average (binomial test: p = .033; continuous test: 
z = −1.99, p = .023).
Note that when we removed from the analyses all the 
studies that explored the effects of glucose rinsing 
(because these have a somewhat different theoretical 
background), p-curve results did not improve. After the 
glucose-rinsing experiments were removed, neither the 
continuous test (z = −0.57, p = .285) nor the binomial test 
(p = .668) suggested that the remaining set of studies had 
any evidential value. Furthermore, both tests (continu-
ous: z = −1.94, p = .026; binomial: p = .024) suggested 
that the p-curve was significantly flatter than would be 
expected if there were an effect but the studies had only 
33% power on average. In other words, the poor results 
of the previous tests cannot be attributed to the inclusion 
of glucose-rinsing studies in the analyses.
Discussion
The results of our analyses suggest that the relationship 
between glucose levels and self-control behaviors might 
be unreliable. Figure 1 shows that the key p values of the 
19 studies included in the present analyses follow a sur-
prisingly flat distribution. This is exactly the pattern of 
results that one would expect to find if those results were 
false positives. These results remain unchanged regard-
less of whether glucose-rinsing studies are included or 
excluded from the sample.
These results may not come as a complete surprise 
given the empirical challenges to the glucose hypothesis 
suggested by failed replications ( Job et al., 2013; Kelly 
et al., 2015; Lange & Eggert, 2014; Lange et al., 2014) and 
theoretical critiques regarding its biological plausibility 
(Kurzban, 2010; Osman, 2014). Furthermore, a detailed 
analysis of the seminal article suggesting the glucose 
hypothesis showed that the number of significant find-
ings reported in that article was too large, given the low 
power of each study (Schimmack, 2012). In other words, 
the results were too good to be true (Francis, 2012).
Nevertheless, the findings from the present study are a 
surprise in the context of the wide acceptance of the 
glucose hypothesis in general scientific research and its 
popularity, as evidenced by the number of citations of 
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Fig. 1. Distribution of observed p values for both the main analysis and 
the robustness test, along with the expected distribution of p values if the 
null hypothesis is true (zero effect) and if the alternative hypothesis is 
true but the experiments lack sufficient power (true effect, 33% power).
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Gailliot et al. (2007) in the literature and the continued 
influence of this hypothesis in recent reviews on ego 
depletion (e.g., Baumeister, 2014; Baumeister & Alghamdi, 
2015). Moreover, the hypothesis has intuitive and seem-
ingly practical appeal. If one accepts that a failure of self-
control in regulating actions contributes to the many 
personal and societal problems that people face (Bau-
meister et al., 2000), then glucose supplements would 
provide a simple means to enhance willpower and ame-
liorate these problems (Baumeister & Tierny, 2011). In 
light of our results, it is doubtful that such a recommen-
dation will work in the real world. This conclusion con-
verges with recent evidence that glucose might have little 
or no impact on domain-general decision-making tasks 
(Orquin & Kurzban, 2016) and with an intriguing series 
of meta-analyses and preregistered replications suggest-
ing that the ego-depletion effect itself might be less 
robust than previously thought (Carter, Kofler, Forster, & 
McCullough, 2015; Hagger et al., in press).
Previous criticisms of the glucose model of ego deple-
tion have typically focused on individual articles (e.g., 
Kurzban, 2010; Schimmack, 2012). Article-level analyses 
such as those by Francis (2012) are ideal in some respects 
because they ensure that all the studies under scrutiny 
are grounded in the same theoretical view and rely on 
very similar research methods. Unfortunately, only a cou-
ple of the articles included in the present review contain 
a sufficiently large number of studies to allow this type 
of analysis (Gailliot et al., 2007; possibly Hagger & 
Chatzisarantis, 2013). An examination of the wider litera-
ture, such as the one offered in the present article, must 
necessarily collate studies with heterogeneous methods 
and theoretical backgrounds. In exchange, this approach 
allows researchers to check for publication and reporting 
biases in areas of research in which articles with a small 
number of studies are prevalent. In this sense, our study 
adds to the conclusions of article-level analyses by sug-
gesting that the kinds of biases that have been detected 
in isolated studies might be representative of the wider 
area of research on the glucose model of ego depletion. 
In any case, the rest of the experiments included in the 
present analyses, with the possible exception of glucose-
rinsing studies, share a common theoretical background.
It is worth noting that, as with any other statistical test, 
p-curve analysis is not a flawless indicator of bias (Bishop 
& Thompson, 2016; Bruns & Ioannidis, 2016; Lakens, 
2015). Our results suggest that, on average, these studies 
have little or no evidential value, but they do not allow 
us to determine whether the significant results are due to 
publication bias, selective reporting of outcomes or anal-
yses, p-hacking, or all of these. It is not impossible that 
some of these studies are exploring small but true effects 
and that their evidential value may be diluted by the 
biases that pervade the rest of the studies. Perhaps future 
research will show that glucose does play a role in ego-
depletion effects, but our conclusions are based on the 
analysis of the extant literature in this area. Thus, our 
contribution must be seen as an additional piece of infor-
mation in the wider context of attempts to verify the reli-
ability of the glucose model of ego depletion. Note that 
the kind of biases explored in the present study are prev-
alent in other (but not all) areas of psychological research 
(e.g., Bakker, van Dijk, & Wicherts, 2012) and that low 
reproducibility is not exclusively a problem of psycho-
logical research (Camerer et al., 2016; Errington et al., 
2014). In fact, it is fair to say that psychology is taking a 
leading role in the dissemination of open research prac-
tices (Open Science Collaboration, 2015). We hope that 
this new trend in psychological research will soon render 
meta-analytic studies like this one unnecessary.
Action Editor
D. Stephen Lindsay served as action editor for this article.
Author Contributions
All the authors developed the study concept. The literature 
search was conducted by M. A. Vadillo and N. Gold. M. A. 
Vadillo performed the data analysis and interpretation. M. 
Osman drafted the manuscript, and M. A. Vadillo and N. Gold 
provided critical revisions. All the authors approved the final 
version of the manuscript for submission.
Acknowledgments
We are indebted to Greg Francis, David R. Shanks, Eric-Jan 
Wagenmakers, and two anonymous reviewers for their valu-
able comments on earlier versions of the manuscript.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The authors declared that they had no conflicts of interest with 
respect to their authorship or the publication of this article.
Funding
This work was supported by European Research Council Grant 
283849 (to N. Gold) under the European Union’s Seventh 
Framework Programme (FP/2007–2013).
Open Practices
All data have been made publicly available via the Open Sci-
ence Framework and can be accessed at https://osf.io/4a6jk/. 
The complete Open Practices Disclosure for this article can 
be found at http://pss.sagepub.com/content/by/supplemental-
data. This article has received the badge for Open Data. More 
information about the Open Practices badges can be found 
at https://osf.io/tvyxz/wiki/1.%20View%20the%20Badges/ and 
http://pss.sagepub.com/content/25/1/3.full.
 by guest on July 14, 2016pss.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
The Glucose Model of Ego Depletion 7
References
References marked with an asterisk indicate studies included in 
the meta-analysis.
Bakker, M., van Dijk, A., & Wicherts, J. M. (2012). The rules 
of the game called psychological science. Perspectives on 
Psychological Science, 7, 543–554.
Baumeister, R. F. (2014). Self-regulation, ego depletion, and 
inhibition. Neuropsychologia, 65, 313–319.
Baumeister, R. F., & Alghamdi, N. G. (2015). Role of self-control 
failure in immoral and unethical actions. Current Opinion 
in Psychology, 6, 66–69.
Baumeister, R. F., Bratslavsky, E., Muraven, M., & Tice, D. M. 
(1998). Ego depletion: Is the active self a limited resource? 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 1252–1265.
Baumeister, R. F., Muraven, M., & Tice, D. M. (2000). Ego 
depletion: A resource model of volition, self-regulation, 
and controlled processing. Social Cognition, 18, 130–150.
Baumeister, R. F., & Tierny, J. (2011). Willpower: Rediscovering 
the greatest human strength. New York, NY: Penguin Press.
*Birnie, L. H. W., Smallwood, J., Reay, J., & Riby, L. M. (2015). 
Glucose and the wandering mind: Not paying attention or 
simply out of fuel? Psychopharmacology, 232, 2903–2910.
Bishop, D. V. M., & Thompson, P. A. (2016). Problems in using 
p-curve analysis and text-mining to detect rate of p-hacking 
and evidential value. PeerJ, 4, Article e1715. doi:10.7717/
peerj.1715
Bruns, S. B., & Ioannidis, J. P. A. (2016). p-curve and p-hacking 
in observational research. PLoS ONE, 11, Article e0149144. 
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0149144
Camerer, C. F., Dreber, A., Forsell, E., Ho, T. H., Huber, J., 
Johannesson, M., . . . Wu, H. (2016). Evaluating replicabil-
ity of laboratory experiments in economics. Science, 351, 
1433–1436.
Carter, E. C., Kofler, L. M., Forster, D. E., & McCullough, M. E. 
(2015). A series of meta-analytic tests of the depletion effect: 
Self-control does not seem to rely on a limited resource. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 144, 796–815.
Carter, E. C., & McCullough, M. E. (2013). After a pair of self-
control-intensive tasks, sucrose swishing improves subse-
quent working memory performance. BMC Psychology, 1, 
Article 22. doi:10.1186/2050-7283-1-22
*Denson, T. F., von Hippel, W., Kemp, R. I., & Teo, L. S. (2010). 
Glucose consumption decreases impulsive aggression in 
response to provocation in aggressive individuals. Journal 
of Experimental Social Psychology, 46, 1023–1028.
*DeWall, C. N., Baumeister, R. F., Gailliot, M. T., & Maner, J. K. 
(2008). Depletion makes the heart grow less helpful: Helping 
as a function of self-regulatory energy and genetic relatedness. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34, 1653–1662.
*Dickinson, D. L., McElroy, T., & Stroh, N. (2014). Impact of glucose 
on Bayesian versus heuristic-based decision making. Journal 
of Neuroscience, Psychology, and Economics, 7, 237–247.
*Dvorak, R. D., & Simons, J. S. (2009). Moderation of resource 
depletion in the self-control strength model: Differing 
effects of two modes of self-control. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 35, 572–583.
Errington, T. M., Iorns, E., Gunn, W., Tan, F. E., Lomax, J., & Nosek, 
B. A. (2014). An open investigation of the reproducibility of 
cancer biology research. eLife, 3, Article e04333. doi:10.7554/
eLife.04333
Francis, G. (2012). Too good to be true: Publication bias in 
two prominent studies from experimental psychology. 
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 19, 151–156.
Freud, S. (1961). The ego and the id. In J. Strachey (Ed. & 
Trans.), The standard edition of the complete psychologi-
cal works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 19, pp. 1–66). London, 
England: Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1923)
*Gailliot, M. T. (2012). Improved self-control associated 
with using relatively large amounts of glucose: Learning 
self-control is metabolically expensive. Psychology, 3, 
987–990.
Gailliot, M. T., & Baumeister, R. F. (2007). The physiol-
ogy of willpower: Linking blood glucose to self-control. 
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 11, 303–327.
*Gailliot, M. T., Baumeister, R. F., DeWall, C. N., Maner, J. K., 
Plant, E. A., Tice, D., . . . Schmeichel, B. J. (2007). Self-
control relies on glucose as a limited energy source: 
Willpower is more than a metaphor. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 92, 325–336.
*Gailliot, M. T., Peruche, B. M., Plant, E. A., & Baumeister, R. F.  
(2009). Stereotypes and prejudice in the blood: Sucrose 
drinks reduce prejudice and stereotyping. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 45, 288–290.
*Hagger, M. S., & Chatzisarantis, N. L. D. (2013). The sweet taste 
of success: The presence of glucose in the oral cavity mod-
erates the depletion of self-control resources. Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 39, 28–42.
Hagger, M. S., Chatzisarantis, N. L. D., Alberts, H., Anggono, C. O., 
Batailler, C., Birt, A., . . . Zwienenberg, M. (in press). A mul-
tilab preregistered replication of the ego-depletion effect. 
Perspectives on Psychological Science.
Hagger, M. S., Wood, C., Stiff, C., & Chatzisarantis, N. L. (2010). 
Ego depletion and the strength model of self-control: A 
meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 136, 495–525.
*Howard, M. A., & Marczinski, C. A. (2010). Acute effects of a 
glucose energy drink on behavioral control. Experimental 
and Clinical Psychopharmacology, 18, 553–561.
*Job, V., Walton, G. M., Bernecker, K., & Dweck, C. S. (2013). 
Beliefs about willpower determine the impact of glucose 
on self-control. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences, USA, 110, 14837–14842.
*Kelly, C. L., Sünram-Lea, S. I., & Crawford, T. J. (2015). The role 
of motivation, glucose and self-control in the antisaccade 
task. PLoS ONE, 10, Article e0122218. doi:10.1371/journal 
.pone.0122218
Kurzban, R. (2010). Does the brain consume additional glu-
cose during self-control tasks? Evolutionary Psychology, 8, 
244–259.
Lakens, D. (2015). What p-hacking really looks like: A comment 
on Masicampo and LaLande (2012). Quarterly Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 68, 829–832.
*Lange, F., & Eggert, F. (2014). Sweet delusion. Glucose drinks 
fail to counteract ego depletion. Appetite, 75, 54–63.
*Lange, F., Seer, C., Rapior, M., Rose, J., & Eggert, F. (2014). 
Turn it all you want: Still no effect of sugar consumption on 
ego depletion. Journal of European Psychology Students, 
5(3), 1–8. doi:10.5334/jeps.cc
 by guest on July 14, 2016pss.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
8 Vadillo et al.
*Masicampo, E. J., & Baumeister, R. F. (2008). Toward a physi-
ology of dual-process reasoning and judgment: Lemonade, 
willpower, and expensive rule-based analysis. Psychological 
Science, 19, 255–260.
*Molden, D. C., Hui, C. M., Scholer, A. A., Meier, B. P., Noreen, 
E. E., D’Agostino, P. R., & Martin, V. (2012). Motivational 
versus metabolic effects of carbohydrates on self-control. 
Psychological Science, 23, 1137–1144.
*Open Science Collaboration. (2015). Estimating the repro-
ducibility of psychological science. Science, 349, 943. 
doi:10.1126/science.aac4716
Orquin, J. L., & Kurzban, R. (2016). A meta-analysis of blood 
glucose effects on human decision making. Psychological 
Bulletin, 142, 546–567.
Osman, M. (2014). Future-minded: The psychology of agency 
and control. Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan.
Owen, L., Scholey, A. B., Finnegan, Y., Hu, H., & Sünram-Lea, 
S. I. (2012). The effect of glucose dose and fasting interval on 
cognitive function: A double-blind, placebo-controlled, six-
way crossover study. Psychopharmacology, 220, 577–589.
*Sanders, M. A., Shirk, S. D., Burgin, C. J., & Martin, L. L. (2012). 
The gargle effect: Rinsing the mouth with glucose enhances 
self-control. Psychological Science, 23, 1470–1472.
Schimmack, U. (2012). The ironic effect of significant results 
on the credibility of multiple-study articles. Psychological 
Methods, 17, 551–566.
Simmons, J. P., Nelson, L. D., & Simonsohn, U. (2011). False-
positive psychology: Undisclosed flexibility in data collec-
tion and analysis allows presenting anything as significant. 
Psychological Science, 11, 1359–1366.
Simonsohn, U., Nelson, L. D., & Simmons, J. P. (2014). 
P-curve: A key to the file-drawer. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 143, 534–547.
*Wang, X. T., & Dvorak, R. D. (2010). Sweet future: Fluctuating 
blood glucose levels affect future discounting. Psychological 
Science, 21, 183–188.
 by guest on July 14, 2016pss.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
